Starting from a non-religious viewpoint, Guy Rundle's piece, A question of humanity, is a good counterbalance to the marginalisation of core bioethical questions in some secular circles via an over-excitement about religious interventions.
I don't agree with what he considers to be an adequate and unavoidable dismissal of the God-question, though this is par for the course among 'cultured despisers'. Even when the importance of conscience is recognised.The work of Ian Markham might give an essentially Kantian rationalist pause for thought in this area, not least because he is close enough to that tradition as a Christian theologian to pose the questions and issues in ways which might be felt. Especially in Plurality and Christian Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; revised edition November 1999, SevenBridgesPress) and Truth and the Reality of God (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998). But the tenor of Rundle is a huge improvement on some of what's out there, and indicative of the fact that a reasoned conversation can be had.
Markham makes the point that, even if one eschews absolutism or any sense that we human beings can access the absolute, the issue of whether ethics can be rendered coherent without recourse to the the transcendent (I would prefer to say with Westphal, 'the gift') is one which, contrary to the casual optimism of many non-religious thinkers, cannot be dismissed. Finally I don't think it can, though that isn't to deny that the non-religious can and do behave morally and the religious (all too frequently) immorally. The difference made by God and the failure of those who name God to comprehend or respond ethically to that difference are not identical issues ontologically, but not finally separable practically either.
Meanwhile, Cardinal Cormac Murphy O'Connor (who I always though was a decent man when I knew him a little in ecumenical circles, though no deep thinker) shows humanity in his article 'We are made for more'. But, of course, he lets his own church off an absolutely enormous hook (its whole reductionist and morally one-sided stance toward bioethics), is seen to be trying to blame-shift towards atheists, and therefore has no chance of getting through with any of the rightful issues he may wish to raise. This is a good example of the fact that Church representatives need a wholesale re-think of their Christendom assumptions in both formulating and communicating their concerns.
2 comments:
"...the issue of whether ethics can be rendered coherent without recourse to the the transcendent...is one which, contrary to the casual optimism of many non-religious thinkers, cannot be dismissed. Finally I don't think it can, though that isn't to deny that the non-religious can and do behave morally and the religious (all too frequently) immorally."
It never ceases to astonish me, 1600 years after Euthyphro, how many religious people seem to think that belief in God itself gives some clear grounding to ethics (although I don't include you here, as I am quite sure you are aware of the problems I am suggesting). Yes, it is very difficult to ground ethics without the transcendent, but it is just as difficult to ground ethics in the transcendent without decending to "It just is!" posturing.
This is especially true with God as the creator of ethical values. Unless we are to accept a self-interested basis for morality (and that hardly requires a transcendent basis!) then it seems to me incoherent to imagine that this provides an acceptable explanation for ethics. There must be some background ethical values for God to be imbued with the power to create ethics. I have expressed this before like this (http://unifiedview.blogspot.com/2006/06/god-and-authority.html):
The only way that God could have the authority to create morality without reducing the concept of morality to orders backed by threats is to conceive of authority as moral in nature. This seems to me to be what is generally meant by the term. When we say someone has authority, we mean that they have characteristics which make it good to accept their commands, or at least to take them into account. It is submitted that this is the only rational way to conceive of God's claim of authority to create morality. It must be that He has the moral characteristics to make it right for people to follow what He says.
The downfall of this should be obvious. If God's authority to create morality stems from moral characteristics He possesses, then the morality of these characteristics must come from elsewhere. God cannot bestow on himself the authority to do this, as he must have authority in order to create any moral truths, including authority. The authority to create morality including authority must come from elsewhere. If God is to have any role in morality, it cannot be as its sole creator. There must be some background source of his authority.
I *will* get back to you on this - but I'm on holiday at the moment, and for once in my (recent) life am managing mostly to stay away from the computer! OK, not right now... but mostly. We ought to have a few pints on this one ;) Generally speaking, I think Richard Kearney is heading in the right direction with 'The God Who May Be' (see a good review here - http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1241 I agree with the criticisms, though I would suggest several ripostes to the Derridean response, and I think the agonistic/agnostic tradition is rather more traditional, in a good sense, than the reviewer recognises.)
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